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Habeas Corpus in the War Against Terrorism: Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld and Citizen Enemy Combatants
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 11, 2004, Yaser Hamdi arrived home in Saudi Arabia
after being held incommunicado in U.S. Navy brigs for nearly three
years.1 Without a hearing and without formal charges ever having been
filed against him, Hamdi was detained as an “enemy combatant”2
following his seizure by Afghan allies of the United States, allegedly on
a battlefield in Afghanistan. Hamdi’s release was part of a settlement
negotiated by his defense counsel and the U.S. Department of Justice3
after the United States Supreme Court ruled in his favor on a writ of
habeas corpus petition filed by his father.4
In times of national crisis civil liberties are sometimes abridged in
exchange for greater security.5 The Framers, countenancing such an
1. U.S.-Freed ‘Combatant’ Is Returned to Saudi Arabia, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A8;
Jerry Markon, Father Denounces Hamdi’s Imprisonment; Son Posed No Threat to U.S., He Says,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2004, at A4.
2. “There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the Government has never
provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such. . . . [F]or
purposes of this case . . . [Hamdi] is an individual who . . . was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile
to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States’ there.” The Court limited itself to the question “whether the detention of
citizens falling within that definition is authorized.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639
(2004). See also, Jason Binimow, Annotation, Designation as Unlawful or Enemy Combatant, 185
A.L.R. FED. 475 (2004).
3. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Statement of Mark Corallo, Director of Public
Affairs, Regarding Yaser Hamdi, #640, Sept. 22, 2004 at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/Septem
ber/04_opa_640.htm. See also U.S.-Freed ‘Combatant’ Is Returned to Saudi Arabia, supra note 1, at
A8 (Hamdi’s settlement required him to relinquish his U.S. citizenship, remain in Saudi Arabia for
five years, renounce terrorism, agree not to sue the U.S. for his imprisonment, and bars him from
ever traveling to Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, or Syria); Eric Lichtblau, U.S., Bowing to Court
Ruling, Will Free ‘Enemy Combatant,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1.
4. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2638. Two similar cases were decided at the same time: Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, (2004), and Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). These cases will not be
discussed at length here because Rumsfeld v. Padilla was decided on a jurisdictional question and
did not reach the habeas issue, and Rasul v. Bush involved an alien habeas petitioner; this Note
focuses on the application of habeas corpus to citizen enemy combatants of the War Against
Terrorism.
5. See, e.g., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (“Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of
great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our
calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is
American citizenship.”); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 714 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The Constitution
envisions grave national emergencies and contemplates significant domestic abridgements of
individual liberties during such times.”), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); cf. Steven R. Shapiro,
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eventuality, granted to Congress the power to suspend the right to a writ
of habeas corpus in times of rebellion or invasion.6 In Hamdi’s case,
Congress had not suspended habeas corpus, though it had authorized the
president to use military power against terrorists and their allies.7 Yet the
executive sought to curtail Hamdi’s access to habeas corpus by
classifying him as an enemy combatant, thereby subjecting him to
executive discretion instead of domestic criminal law with all of its
attendant constitutional protections. Hamdi’s petition and the
government’s arguments supporting his detention led to questions about
separation of powers and the protection of civil liberties in times of
national threat. In such times the public desire for security spikes, and
officials charged with the public’s safety will feel either pressure to
guarantee security at all costs or be tempted to exploit the public fear to
their own political or ideological ends.8
It is the function of the judiciary to stand as a bulwark against the
people’s representatives when public fear and outrage compel or allow
measures that contravene or undermine core constitutional principles.9
This responsibility is most effectively fulfilled when the courts use
conflicts like Hamdi’s as opportunities to reiterate or pronounce brightline legal rules that make the boundaries of proper government action

Defending Civil Liberties in the War on Terror: The Role of the Courts in the War Against
Terrorism: A Preliminary Assessment, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103, 103 (2005)
(“Unsurprisingly, many of our nation’s most shameful civil liberties violations have occurred during
war or under a perceived threat of war.”).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see generally Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend
Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Arguments Surrounding Ex parte Merryman, 34 U. BALT. L.
REV. 11 (2004) (presenting the debate about whether the executive may also suspend habeas corpus
in times of emergency, and concluding that excluding the president from that power is an important
structural limitation that protects civil liberties).
7. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (“In General.—That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons.”).
8. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963) (“The imperative necessity for
safeguarding . . . rights to procedural due process under the gravest of emergencies has existed
throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that there
is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared,
will inhibit government action.”); see also Jennifer M. Hannigan, Comment, Playing Patriot Games:
National Security Challenges Civil Liberties, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1375 (2004) (citing Justice
Brennan’s factors outlining the motivation to infringe civil liberties during times of crisis: the
national fervor that leads to an exaggeration of the security risks that supposedly would result from
full exercise of civil liberties; the public’s willingness to accept abridgements of its liberties in
exchange for more security in the face of the exaggerated risks; and the inexperience (or, I would
add, self-serving calculations) of decisionmakers who are unwilling or unable to scrutinize the crisis
and distinguish legitimate risks from hyperbole).
9. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
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clear for citizenry and public officials alike. Hamdi’s petition was an
opportunity for the Court to reinforce, in a time of crisis, the fundamental
liberty of corporal freedom that habeas corpus guarantees by construing
the Constitution’s separation of powers strictly instead of subjectively.
Unfortunately, the plurality’s balancing test failed to do so in three
significant ways: (1) it failed to clarify the separation of powers of the
three branches of federal government; (2) it failed to protect adequately
the rights guaranteed by habeas corpus doctrine; and (3) it failed to create
clarity and predictability for citizen detainees. The Court should have
resolved the debate with a strict interpretation of habeas corpus doctrine
and other constitutional principles, rather than a nebulous balancing test
that accommodates Congress’s avoidance of political responsibility
while indulging the president’s military power.
Even though Hamdi is limited to detainees classified as enemy
combatants it puts all citizens at risk. The War Against Terrorism is
clearly not a conventional war and the terrorist enemy is not readily
apparent. Activities ranging from political activism to library and internet
usage to travel can raise red flags to security and intelligence officers
putting anyone, however innocent, under the national security
microscope. Moreover, because of the religious and racial factors
involved in Middle Eastern terrorism, certain minority populations are
more likely to be targeted for government action, whether it is justified
or not. The implication is that this war will be fought internally as much
as abroad, making everyone a potential suspect that could be classified as
an enemy combatant and treated according to Hamdi. Furthermore, there
is no identifiable end to this war and the adjustments made by the
American public will be in place for a long time, and may become
permanent either because the War Against Terrorism will be
interminable, or through the force of habit, tradition, and precedent. To
avoid abuses in the zealous prosecution of this war the perimeters of
executive power must be drawn clearly, strictly enforced, and
fundamental liberties jealously guarded.
II. HAMDI V. RUMSFELD
A. Background
The U.S. Constitution forbids the suspension of a citizen’s right to a
writ of habeas corpus “unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”10 The placement of this clause within

10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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Article I places suspension within the power of Congress when it is
deemed necessary.11 The implementation of habeas corpus and the
procedure for its invocation are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Section
2241(a) and (b) place jurisdiction over petitions for the writ in the
Supreme Court as a forum of first resort, as well as in the federal
courts.12 Section 2241(c) defines the proper petitioner for a writ of
habeas corpus.13 Section 2241(d) creates federal court habeas jurisdiction
over petitioners from State custody.14
The first serious challenge to executive authority over citizen enemy
combatants arose from a habeas corpus petition following the Civil War.
President Lincoln had suspended habeas corpus in September 1863
pursuant to an act of Congress authorizing suspension upon the
president’s determination.15 Ex parte Milligan16 followed the
11. See Jackson, supra note 6 (concluding that, although the Constitution is not explicit in
giving the power of suspension solely to Congress and thus excluding the President, structural
considerations and judicial precedent make it clear that the President cannot suspend the writ of
habeas corpus).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2441(a)-(b) (2000) states:
Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a
circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the
restraint complained of is had. The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit
judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer
the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to
entertain it.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2441(c) (2000) states:
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless— (1) He is in custody
under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before
some court thereof; or (2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an
Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the
United States; or (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States; or (4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in
custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege,
protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign
state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of
nations; or (5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2441(d) (2000) states:
Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under
the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal
judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein
such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State
court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall
have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the district
wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of
justice may transfer the application to the other district court for hearing and
determination.
15. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 104 (President Lincoln actually suspended the writ without first
obtaining congressional authorization. Congress later granted authorization after the decision in Ex
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487), which held that the Constitution only
allows Congress to suspend habeas corpus.).
16. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
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reinstatement of habeas corpus at the close of the war. Milligan, a
civilian, was charged with complicity with the Confederacy as a result of
his attempts to undermine Union war efforts in Indiana. He was tried by
a military court and sentenced to death.17 Although the district court in
Milligan recognized the special circumstances of insurrection, it held that
constitutional principles such as due process could not be negated by
national emergency.18 The court held that since Milligan was a citizen of
a loyal state in which the courts were open throughout the war, the
military commission that condemned him had no jurisdiction over him.19
In Ex parte Quirin, a World War II case involving German saboteurs
who disembarked from submarines in New York and Florida, the
military commission that tried the saboteurs sentenced them to death.20
The Supreme Court held that the president’s war powers conferred
jurisdiction over enemy combatants upon the executive branch.21 In his
application for a writ of habeas corpus, one of the defendants argued that
his U.S. citizenship entitled him to more stringent due process
protections, specifically the right to a jury trial.22 The Court denied his
application, holding that his status as an “unlawful combatant” placed
him squarely within the purview of military tribunals and no right to jury
trial existed there.23 The Court distinguished Milligan upon the Quirin
defendants’ admission to being unlawful combatants as opposed to
Milligan’s status as a civilian together with the uncertainty about the
charges leveled against him.24
While the doctrine of habeas corpus is well developed, it is unclear
how habeas corpus applies to enemy combatants who are also U.S.
citizens. Prior to Hamdi, “[t]he Supreme Court decided the most nearly
applicable case, Quirin, on stipulated facts, never considering what
factual demonstration was required.”25 This condition was probably due,

17. Id. at 107.
18. Id. at 120-21 (“The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism . . . .”).
19. Id. at 121-22 (Martial jurisdiction “can never be applied to citizens in states which have
upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed. . . . [N]o usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any offerce [sic]
whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service.”).
20. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
21. Id. at 11.
22. Id. at 24.
23. Id. at 15-16.
24. Id. at 19.
25. Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 35 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 939, 1004 (Fall 2003).
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in part, to the paucity of cases involving citizen enemy combatants and,
in part, to the finite durations of most of America’s wars. The War
Against Terrorism presents the courts with a new dilemma: what if the
citizen enemy combatant was taken during a nontraditional war that has
no end in sight? Thus, when citizen detainees of the War Against
Terrorism, like Hamdi, disputed their designation as enemy combatants,
the federal courts found themselves between a rock and a hard place—
between the government’s security and military interests and the
detainee’s compelling interest in avoiding indefinite, perpetual, and
potentially unjustified detention—without clear precedent to determine
the outcome.
Each court faced with the issue came to a different conclusion. The
Eastern District of Virginia determined that core American constitutional
principles trump the government’s unproven interest in detaining
Hamdi.26 The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, weighed the balance
differently.27 The Supreme Court then applied the problem to its own
scales and came up with yet a third result. Similar discrepancies can be
found in the José Padilla court decisions28 and the executive’s decision to
prosecute John Walker Lindh under the traditional criminal justice
system.29

26. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 536 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“We must protect the
freedoms of even those who hate us, and that we may find objectionable. If we fail in this task, we
become victims of the precedents we create. We have prided ourselves on being a nation of laws
applying equally to all and not a nation of men who have few or no standards . . . . We must preserve
the rights afforded to us by our Constitution and laws for without it we return to the chaos of a rule
of men and not of laws. Our Constitution was the first to develop a government of checks and
balances . . . . While the Executive may very well be correct that Hamdi is an enemy combatant
whose rights have not been violated, the Court is unwilling, on the sparse facts before it to find so at
this time on the basis of the Mobbs Declaration.”), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
27. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The safeguards that all
Americans have come to expect in criminal prosecutions do not translate neatly to the arena of
armed conflict. . . . For there is a ‘well-established power of the military to exercise jurisdiction over
members of the armed forces, those directly connected with such forces, and enemy belligerents,
prisoners of war, and others charged with violating the laws of war.’ As we emphasized in our prior
decision, any judicial inquiry into Hamdi’s status as an alleged enemy combatant in Afghanistan
must reflect this deference as well as ‘a recognition that government has no more profound
responsibility’ than the protection of American citizens from further terrorist attacks.”), vacated, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (citations omitted).
28. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the AUMF did not
authorize the resident to detain American citizens, as required by the Non-Detention Act (18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a) (2001)), and that the constitution does not extend the executive’s war powers to cover the
detention of citizens as enemy combatants without any kind of process), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711
(2004).
29. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002). Lindh was taken in
Afghanistan under practically identical circumstances as Hamdi.
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B. Facts and Procedure
One week after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New
York City and Washington, D.C., Congress passed a joint resolution
entitled Authorization to Use Military Force (“AUMF”), authorizing the
president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed or aided the terrorist attacks.”30 Nearly four weeks later,
combat operations in Afghanistan commenced.31 Yaser Hamdi was
captured by the Northern Alliance in December 2001.32 He was
surrendered to U.S. forces which detained and interrogated him in
Afghanistan.33 In January of 2002, Hamdi was transferred to the U.S.
naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and subjected to further
interrogation. Upon confirmation that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, he was
transferred in April of 2002 to a naval brig in Virginia, and then later to a
similar facility in South Carolina.34 In June of 2002, Hamdi’s father filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Virginia.35
1. Hamdi’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
Hamdi’s petition claimed his detention was not legally authorized.36
The AUMF did not suspend habeas corpus, and Hamdi had not been
charged with any crime nor afforded any process.37 Specifically, the
petition requested that the court:
(1) appoint counsel for Hamdi; (2) order [the government] to cease
interrogating him; (3) declare that he is being held in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) . . . “schedule an evidentiary
hearing, at which [the government might] adduce proof in support of
[its] allegations”; and (5) order that Hamdi be released from his
“unlawful custody.”38

30. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 7.
31. See, e.g., Mark Skertic, U.S., Britain Launch Attack on Afghanistan, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2001, at 3.
32. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004).
33. Id. at 2636.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see generally 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2004).
36. Brief for Petitioners/Appellees at 9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-6895).
37. Id.
38. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2636 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir.
2002)). The original petition filed by Hamdi’s father and Frank Dunham, the Federal Public
Defender, could not be obtained.
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The district court appointed counsel and ordered the government to allow
Hamdi the same access to counsel as is normally accorded to criminal
defendants.39
2. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Upon the government’s appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals40
reversed the order, holding that Hamdi was a special case - one that
required greater deference to the executive because of the associated
threats to national security and impairment of the government’s efforts to
gather counter-terrorist intelligence.41 In essence, the Fourth Circuit’s
reasoning employed its own balancing test, weighing the national
security interests of the government against Hamdi’s personal liberty
interest.
Acknowledging that this was no ordinary criminal case, the appellate
court held that traditional constitutional deference to the executive in
“sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military affairs”
should have slowed the district court’s nearly automatic employment of
the habeas routine.42 The court observed that there was “little indication
in the order . . . that the [district court] gave proper weight to national
security concerns,” and instructed the lower court to consider “the most
cautious procedures first” upon remand.43
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit also denied the government’s
motion to dismiss the petition altogether.44 The government argued that
the executive’s designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant put him
beyond the reach of judicial review.45 This was due to the military and
national security nature of Hamdi’s detention which gave rise to the
deference owed to the executive in such matters. The Fourth Circuit
rejected the government’s expansive interpretation, holding that “with no
meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy
combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on

39. See Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281.
40. Id. This case is known as “Hamdi II.” “Hamdi I,” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th
Cir. 2002), dismissed a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a public defender and a private
citizen neither of which had any relationship with Hamdi, thereby failing the “next friend”
requirement.
41. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281.
42. Id. (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936)).
43. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 282, 284.
44. Id. at 283.
45. Id.; Brief for Respondents/Appellants at 28, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-6895).
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the government’s say-so.”46 The Fourth Circuit’s decision changed the
issue to how much judicial protection habeas petitioners could expect
once they had been classified as enemy combatants by the executive
branch.47
3. The government’s argument
On remand, the government conceded the judiciary’s jurisdiction
over habeas corpus petitions of citizen enemy combatants.48 It also
adjusted its judicial deference argument; instead of asserting that the
executive’s detention of citizen enemy combatants was immune from
judicial review, the government argued that such review was
substantially limited by the deference owed to the executive in matters of
national security and military affairs to the question of whether a
detention was authorized.49 Accordingly, the only evidence provided by
the government to support Hamdi’s detention was a declaration by
Michael Mobbs (“Mobbs Declaration”), a Special Advisor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, that Hamdi was an enemy combatant.
Mobbs supported his conclusion by claiming to be familiar with the facts
and circumstances related to the capture and detention of Hamdi by
virtue of his review of “relevant records and reports.”50 This hearsay, the
government argued, was sufficient to satisfy judicial oversight and the
requirements of due process because of the national security context.51
The government asserted, therefore, that Hamdi’s detention was legal
and the habeas petition should be dismissed.52
4. The Supreme Court of the United States
The district court found the Mobbs Declaration woefully inadequate
to the task of judicial review and rejected the government’s expansive
interpretation of the deference owed by the judiciary.53 As it engaged in

46. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283.
47. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
48. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“In this Court’s hearing
on the matter on August 13, 2002, the Respondents conceded that their determination of Hamdi’s
status was subject to judicial review.”), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 124 S. Ct.
2633.
49. Brief for Respondents/Appellants at 13-18, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-6895).
50. Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
51. Brief for Respondents/Appellants at 13-18, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-6895).
52. Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d. at 528.
53. Id. at 535 (“If the Court were to accept the Mobbs Declaration as sufficient justification
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the balancing process mandated by the Fourth Circuit,54 the district court
found that the government failed to provide evidence sufficiently
weighty for dismissal,55 and repeated its order to the government to
produce proper evidence for in camera review.56 Into the Fourth Circuit
for the second time, the government’s appeal stressed the executive’s
need for wide latitude and discretion in its war-making powers, a
position with which the Fourth Circuit agreed.57 The appellate court
accepted the Mobbs Declaration as sufficient to justify the government’s
position by weighing national security more heavily and Hamdi’s liberty
interest less than the district court did,58 and finding a distinction
between detention authorized by the executive’s enforcement of criminal
law and detention under its war powers function.59 The court held,
therefore, that there was no justification for any further factual inquiry
and remanded with an order to dismiss the petition.60
Dismissal of the case and the subsequent denial of rehearing61 led
Hamdi to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. In a plurality
decision, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s dismissal and
remanded.62 The plurality consisted of four justices: Justice O’Connor,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Justices
Souter and Ginsburg concurred, to secure the minimum of constitutional
protections for Hamdi in the case’s outcome, but denied that the
president had even been authorized to detain him.63 Justices Scalia and
Stevens dissented by applying habeas doctrine strictly, and Justice
Thomas’s dissent accepted the government’s position without

for detaining Hamdi in the present circumstances, then it would in effect be abdicating any
semblance of the most minimal level of judicial review. In effect, this Court would be acting as little
more than a rubber-stamp.”).
54. Id. at 530 (“This case represents the delicate balance that must be struck between the
Executive’s authority in times of armed conflict and the procedural safeguards that our Constitution
provides for American citizens detained in the United States.”).
55. Id. at 535.
56. Id. at 528.
57. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639
(2004).
58. Id. at 477 (“Judicial review does not disappear during wartime, but the review of
battlefield captures in overseas conflicts is a highly deferential one.”).
59. Id. at 473.
60. Id. at 476.
61. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
62. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2652 (2004).
63. Id. at 2660 (“Because I find Hamdi’s detention forbidden by [the Non-Detention Act] and
unauthorized by the Force Resolution, I would not reach any questions of what process he may be
due . . . . Since this disposition does not command a majority of the Court, however, the need to give
practical effect to the conclusions of eight members of the Court rejecting the Government’s position
calls for me to join with the plurality in ordering remand on terms closest to those I would impose.”).
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reservation.64
C. Justice O’Connor’s Opinion for the Plurality
The threshold issue for the plurality was whether detention of citizen
enemy combatants had been authorized. Hamdi challenged the legality of
his detention citing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), the Non-Detention Act, which
states, “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” The plurality
rejected his argument, concluding that the AUMF’s authorization to use
all “necessary and appropriate” force included the power to detain
individuals taken in combat “for the duration of the particular conflict in
which they were captured” because it “is so fundamental and accepted an
incident to war.”65 Justice O’Connor reiterated the Quirin finding that
“there is no bar” to the U.S. holding one of its citizens as an enemy
combatant.66 Although the plurality sympathized with Hamdi’s concern
about the indefinite nature of his detention, agreeing that Congress had
not authorized indefinite detention and that international law allows
detention only for the duration of hostilities, it was deemed irrelevant to
the authorization question since active combat in Afghanistan was
concurrent with the Court’s deliberations.67
Justice O’Connor distinguished Milligan from Hamdi on the
condition of the habeas petitioners upon capture. Milligan was arrested
by the military in his own home in Indiana as a civilian. By contrast,
Hamdi was allegedly taken on the field of battle in Afghanistan carrying
a weapon against coalition soldiers (the Northern Alliance). This,
reasoned Justice O’Connor, made Hamdi more analogous to Haupt, the
defendant in Quirin.68 Indeed, the plurality opinion makes much of
Hamdi’s seizure in a foreign combat zone in finding executive detentions
of citizen enemy combatants legitimate.69
Having found the AUMF and Quirin to satisfy the threshold issue of
whether detention was authorized, Justice O’Connor next considered the
“question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who

64. Doubt remains, therefore, not only in the outcomes of individual cases of citizen enemy
combatant habeas petitioners, but also about the Court’s use of this balancing test itself since five of
the nine justices explicitly opposed Justice O’Connor’s rationale.
65. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41 (holding that “[i]n light of these principles, it is of no
moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention”).
66. Id. at 2640.
67. Id. at 2641-42.
68. Id. at 2642. This is an odd analogy since Haupt was captured on the continental U.S.
which was never a combat zone during World War II.
69. Id. at 2643.
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disputes his enemy-combatant status.”70 Both the government and Hamdi
conceded that, “absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains
available to every individual detained within the United States,” and that
the writ had not been suspended. 71 Justice O’Connor asserted that the
writ of habeas corpus statute is clear in providing habeas petitioners with
an opportunity to challenge the facts used by the government to justify
their detention, and that the courts have some discretion within the
mandates of due process as to how this can be achieved.72 She rejected,
therefore, the government’s assertion that the Mobbs Declaration alone
fulfilled Hamdi’s right to due process.73 Additionally, the Court rejected
the Fourth Circuit’s holding that Hamdi’s status as an enemy combatant
was undisputed as a matter of law by virtue of his capture in a foreign
combat zone: “the circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s seizure cannot in
any way be characterized as ‘undisputed’ as ‘those circumstances are
neither conceded in fact, nor susceptible to concession in law, because
Hamdi has not been permitted to speak for himself or even through
counsel as to those circumstances.”74 On the other hand, the vigorous
habeas order of the district court was likewise rejected as not being
sufficiently delicate in accommodating the government’s concerns.75
To balance these competing interests, Justice O’Connor
compromised between the extremes proposed by the parties. Hamdi
requested a full habeas hearing with unfettered access to counsel.76 The
government argued that the “some evidence” standard77 of the Fourth
Circuit should suffice. The plurality settled upon the Mathews balancing
test, by which “the process due in any given instance is determined by
weighing ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’
against the Government’s asserted interest . . . .”78 Though articulated
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2644.
72. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
73. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648. Although the plurality later stated that hearsay like the Mobbs
Declaration might be acceptable as the most reliable evidence available, id. at 2649, this would be
insufficient in the absence of neutral judicial review of the detainee’s rebuttal to that evidence.
74. Id. at 2644 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 337 F.3d 335, 357 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(Luttig, J., dissenting)).
75. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (“[N]either the process proposed by the Government nor the
process apparently envisioned by the District Court below strikes the proper constitutional
balance . . . .”).
76. Brief for Petitioners at 9-12, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
77. The “some evidence” standard, adopted by the Fourth Circuit in its dismissal of Hamdi’s
petition, called for the court’s focus to be “‘exclusively on the factual basis supplied by the
Executive to support its own determination’” and “‘does not require’ a ‘weighing of the evidence,’
but rather calls for assessing ‘whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion.’” Id. at 2645 (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 34, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct.
2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696)).
78. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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differently, this test is essentially the same as that employed by the
district court and by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Like the lower
courts before it, the plurality weighed Hamdi’s interest in freedom from
bodily restraint against the government’s interest, including “the burdens
the Government would face in providing greater process.”79 For Hamdi,
the Court considered the “interest of the erroneously detained individual”
in preserving his liberty,80 preventing oppression and abuse of innocents
by checking the executive’s power of detention, preserving the checks
and balances of American government generally, and reaffirming the
fundamental right of a citizen “to be free from involuntary confinement
by his own government without due process of law . . . .”81 Finding the
protection of these rights significant, the plurality concluded that the
exigencies of war and national security did not completely override
Hamdi’s private interest.82
On the other hand, the plurality did not ignore the government’s
interests in national security and in the interrogation of Hamdi. The
Court also recognized the burdens that full due process would place on
the government’s war-making abilities. Finding significant weight on
this side of the scales, the plurality was unwilling to mandate the full
criminal process that would normally follow a successful habeas petition.
The balance that the plurality struck was to create what it called
“basic process.”83 “Basic process” retains fundamental protections that
the Court determined to be “core elements;” citizen-detainees are entitled
to “notice of the factual basis for [their] classification” as enemy
combatants, and to “a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”84 On the other hand, “basic
process” does not guarantee other protections normally afforded in
criminal due process, and can, therefore, be “tailored to alleviate [the]
uncommon potential burden on the Executive” of citizen-combatant
proceedings.85 The plurality provided examples of where “basic process”
might deviate from normal criminal due process. For example, normally
inadmissible hearsay, such as the Mobbs Declaration, might be allowed,
or a rebuttable “presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence”
would shift the burden of proof to the habeas petitioner and away from
the executive. 86 Justice O’Connor also mentioned the possible use of
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646.
Id. at 2647.
Id.
Id. at 2646-47.
Id. at 2649.
Id. at 2648-49.
Id. at 2649.
Id.
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military tribunals in lieu of conventional civilian jury trials (with a caveat
to the executive that civilian courts would be open to a habeas petitioner
in the absence of process afforded by military tribunals).87 With this
balance the plurality believed it had satisfied the most important aspects
of both competing interests.
In summary, the plurality held that citizen enemy combatants who
petition for a writ of habeas corpus are entitled to confront the allegations
against them before a neutral decisionmaker. Any further protections of
due process, however, are to be balanced against the executive’s national
security interests and war-making powers with the deference traditionally
accorded those interests. This balance may lead to a lowered standard of
due process, stripped of all but the “essential constitutional promises,”88
than would be expected by a traditional application of habeas corpus
doctrine.
D. Justice Souter’s Concurrence
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, would have ordered
Hamdi’s release. He concluded that the government had “not made out a
case on any theory,” because it had not even met the threshold question
of authorization to detain Hamdi.89 For Justice Souter, the real threshold
issue was “how broadly or narrowly to read the Non-Detention Act.”90
The government argued that the act does not apply to military detentions
in wartime,91 or, alternatively, that the statutory requirement was
satisfied by the AUMF.92 Justice Souter determined that the act’s
legislative history required a strict reading and consequently rejected
both arguments.
Justice Souter noted that the Non-Detention Act was passed in
conjunction with the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950,
which gave the Attorney General broad discretionary power to detain
citizens in times of emergency.93 Congress did so with the express intent
of preventing another episode like the forceful internment of thousands
of innocent and loyal Japanese-Americans during World War II.94 It
87. Id. at 2651. The issue remains, however, as to whether the executive has been authorized
to create military tribunals for citizen enemy combatants. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
88. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649.
89. Id. at 2655.
90. Id. at 2654; 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
91. Brief for Respondents at 21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
92. Id. at 20.
93. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2654.
94. Id.; see generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the
conviction of a Japanese-American for entering an area the executive had declared off-limits to
citizens with Japanese ancestors, by deferring to the executive’s security and war-making
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hoped to preclude that possibility not only by withdrawing the
executive’s authority, but also by requiring Congress to set forth clearly
the exact perimeter of the executive’s power before any detentions could
be made.95 A broad reading of the statute - endorsed by the government
and adopted by the plurality - would undermine this purpose by allowing
authorization to be implied where none is explicitly stated.96
Furthermore, Justice Souter argued, strict construction of the NonDetention Act is mandated by precedent as well as by the legislative
history.97
Justice Souter concluded that the Non-Detention Act does apply to
military detentions during wartime. Looking at the historical context that
motivated the enactment of the Non-Detention Act, he concluded that it
was especially applicable to times of crisis and national emergency, such
as war.98 Refuting the government’s assertion that the act applies only to
the domestic criminal code and not to military detentions,99 Justice
Souter observed that the legislative history clearly indicates that
Congress contemplated that the bill “would sweep beyond imprisonment
for crime and apply to executive detention in furtherance of wartime
security” and intended as much.100
Under strict construction, Justice Souter found that the AUMF did
not authorize Hamdi’s detention because “it never so much as uses the
word detention,” and there would be no reason for Congress to imply
more power than was explicitly granted by the resolution “given the
well-stocked statutory arsenal of defined criminal offenses covering the
gamut of actions that a citizen sympathetic to terrorists might
commit.”101 Justice Souter concluded that Congress intended to preclude
any detention not explicitly sanctioned by a congressional act, fearing
that it “might leave citizens subject to arbitrary executive action, with no
clear demarcation of the limits of executive authority.”102 Because
Congress’s precise intent was “to preclude reliance on vague
congressional authority . . . as authority for detention or imprisonment at
the discretion of the Executive,” the AUMF fails to satisfy the clarity and
responsibilities).
95. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2655.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944) (“We must assume, when asked to
find implied powers in a grant of legislative or executive authority, that the law makers intended to
place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language
they used.”)).
98. See id.
99. Brief for Respondents at 21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
100. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2656.
101. Id. at 2657.
102. Id. at 2654 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92–116, at 2, 4–5 (1971)).
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explicitness requirements of the Non-Detention Act.103 Unless Congress
clearly authorized detention or imprisonment, the executive has no power
to detain citizens on American territory.104
E. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
Justice Scalia looked at the historical development of habeas corpus
in the context of citizen enemy combatants for his reasoning. From this
he concluded that the executive has two alternatives to avoid a court
order to release Hamdi upon a habeas petition: prosecution or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus.105 For Justice Scalia, the distinction between
enemy aliens and citizens who aid the enemy is important because “our
constitutional tradition” is to detain the former for the duration of
hostilities, but to charge the latter with treason or some other offense and
try them criminally.106 Where national crises, such as rebellion or war,
make normal criminal process for suspected traitors impracticable, the
Congress is empowered to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.107
Therefore, if the executive wishes to avoid the burdens imposed by due
process it can only do so only by urging Congress to employ the
Suspension Clause.108
Justice Scalia confronted the plurality position by claiming that,
although the Constitution does not explicitly require a choice between
these alternatives, tradition and precedent preclude any other options.109
Justice Scalia’s examination of the English and early American histories
of habeas corpus, culminated in his reliance upon Ex parte Milligan.110
The conclusion he took from Milligan and the habeas history is that
“criminal process was viewed as the primary means—and the only

103. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2654. Notably, Justices Scalia and Kennedy agree that the AUMF is
not clear enough “to satisfy the interpretive canon that statutes should be construed so as to avoid
grave constitutional concerns; or with the clarity necessary to overcome the statutory prescription
that ‘[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to
an Act of Congress.’ 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).” Id. at 2671 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 2660 (“[T]he Government has failed to justify holding [Hamdi] in the absence of a
further Act of Congress, criminal charges, a showing that the detention conforms to the laws of war,
or a demonstration that [the Non-Detention Act] is unconstitutional. I would therefore vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for proceedings consistent with this view.”).
105. Id.
106. Id. This is exactly what the executive did with John Walker Lindh. See Lindh, supra note
29 and accompanying text.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
108. Although President Lincoln asserted an executive right to suspend habeas corpus during
the Civil War, that interpretation of the Constitution was rejected in Ex parte Merryman. See supra
note 15.
109. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2666.
110. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
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means absent congressional action suspending the writ—not only to
punish traitors, but to incapacitate them,” and that this “is consistent with
the Founders’ general mistrust of military power permanently at the
Executive’s disposal.”111 The plurality’s reliance upon the government’s
interest in national security to abridge due process, therefore, is at odds
with that wariness.112
The plurality relied heavily upon Quirin to avoid the rule in Milligan
and to justify the government’s holding of a U.S. citizen as a military
prisoner instead of as a criminal or traitor. Justice Scalia dismissed
Quirin as poorly decided and of weak value as precedent.113 Furthermore,
the plurality read Quirin incorrectly. According to Justice Scalia it is
properly distinguished from Hamdi’s petition because the defendants in
Quirin conceded that they were enemy invaders, and thus their status as
enemy combatants was undisputed.114 Therefore, Haupt’s (the citizen
enemy combatant in Quirin) detention by the executive under the rules of
war (i.e. without criminal trial and normal due process) was lawful.
Hamdi, on the other hand, vigorously contested his classification as a
belligerent. Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded, “where those
jurisdictional facts are not conceded—where the petitioner insists that he
is not a belligerent—Quirin left the pre-existing law in place: Absent
suspension of the writ, a citizen held where the courts are open is entitled
either to criminal trial or to a judicial decree requiring his release.”115
Since it is not the Court’s function “to make illegal detention legal by
supplying a process that the Government could have provided, but chose
not to,” the Court should have granted Hamdi’s habeas petition instead of
remanding with instructions for “basic process.”116
Justice Scalia would hold that in the absence of suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, criminal proceedings must be brought promptly or

111. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2668.
112. Id. at 2669.
113. Id. (“The case was not this Court’s finest hour.”); see also Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H.
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1296
(2002) (calling Quirin “an old and troubling court decision” and cautioning against its revitalization
as a tool to justify the use of military tribunals against American citizens deemed “unlawful
belligerents”). Historical research on Quirin has revealed that “a principal reason for authorization of
these military tribunals [to be held in secrecy] was the government’s wish to cover up the evidence
of the FBI’s bungling of the case.” Id. at 1291 (citing David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 61 (1996)). Additionally, Quirin is associated temporally and contextually with
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which upheld the executive’s detention of citizens
with Japanese ancestry during World War II. The plurality’s poor choice of precedent in Quirin is a
subject that could occupy another paper of itself and is beyond the scope of this Note.
114. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2670.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2673.
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the detainee must be released.117 The plurality reached beyond the limits
of judicial power by qualifying and limiting the process due to an
American citizen in special circumstances such as the War Against
Terrorism.118 Justice Scalia argued that those limitations are better and
more properly defined by the people’s representatives than by the
Supreme Court’s use of a balancing test of its own devising.119
F. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas accepted the government’s arguments in their
entirety. His conclusion was based on his view of separation of powers
doctrine. Citing such classic cases as Curtiss-Wright, Youngstown Sheet
& Tube, and Dames & Moore, 120 he interpreted a broad sweep of
executive authority over citizens taken in battle as a necessary adjunct to
the president’s national security responsibility.121 Justice Thomas
concluded that the AUMF implicitly gave the executive plenary authority
over any combatant captured, whether or not a U.S. citizen, by
authorizing military action.122 Once the political branches have
determined that the United States is at war and the executive’s security
powers have been authorized, the executive is supported “by the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation.”123 Therefore, although the judiciary may examine the
legality of Hamdi’s detention, it cannot interfere with the executive’s
“political” determination that Hamdi is an enemy combatant.124
Consequently, Justice Thomas accepts the Mobbs Declaration as
sufficient factual basis for Hamdi’s detention.125 Calling upon the
117. Id. at 2671.
118. Justice Scalia called this a “Mr. Fix-it Mentality.” “The plurality seems to view it as its
mission to Make Everything Come Out Right, rather than merely to decree the consequences . . . of
the other two branches’ actions and omissions.” Id. at 2673.
119. Id. at 2672 (“[The Court] claims authority to engage in this sort of ‘judicious balancing’
from Mathews v. Eldridge, a case involving . . . the withdrawal of disability benefits! Whatever the
merits of this technique when newly recognized property rights are at issue (and even there they are
questionable), it has no place where the Constitution and the common law already supply an
answer.” (citations omitted)).
120. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
121. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2675-77.
122. Id. at 2679. He also alluded to the opinion that the no such authorization is ever needed:
“Although the President very well may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our
troops . . . we need not decide that question . . . .” Id.
123. Id. at 2679-80 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981)).
124. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2678.
125. “[I] do not think the plurality has adequately explained the breadth of the President’s
authority . . . an authority that includes making virtually conclusive factual findings. . . . In this
context, due process requires nothing more than a good-faith executive determination.” Id. at 2680.
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Youngstown precedent, Justice Thomas pointed to the reasons why the
courts should not second-guess determinations of this nature made by the
executive. First, in matters of national security and foreign diplomacy
“the courts simply lack the relevant information and expertise . . . .”126
Second, even if the judiciary possessed all of the relevant information, its
decisions on these matters “are simply not amenable to judicial
determination because ‘[t]hey are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy.’”127 Third, the Court has interpreted the
Constitution to assign foreign and military affairs exclusively to the
political branches.128 Of Justice Jackson’s three categories in his
Youngstown concurrence, Justice Thomas puts Hamdi’s detention into
the first category—the president’s authority is at its apogee when his
actions arguably fall within the purview of his Article II powers and he
has received congressional authorization.129 Accordingly, Justice Thomas
would have affirmed the Fourth Circuit ruling dismissing Hamdi’s
petition.130
III. ANALYSIS
Security crises often come into direct conflict with civil liberties. The
record of the United States in dealing with such conflicts is mixed. It is
admirable that civil liberties have been protected and even expanded in
spite of the many security crises through which the nation has passed. On
the other hand, times of threat and fear have frequently led Americans to
accept government intrusions on their liberties.131 In hindsight, the
general sentiment of the American people became one of regret for each
of these incidents and to regard them as unnecessarily drastic.132 Our
responsibility, of course, is to learn from history and to institute policies
126. Id. at 2676; accord Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948).
127. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2676 (quoting Chicago & Southern, 333 U.S. at 111).
128. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2676; accord Chicago & Southern, 333 U.S. at 103.
129. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2677.
130. Id. at 2685.
131. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 103-05 for an overview of intrusions on civil liberties
during national emergencies. These include the following: the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 used
to imprison newspaper editors who were too vocal in their criticism of President Adams’ foreign
policy; President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War used to imprison
newspaper editors who opposed his policies on the Southern rebellion; the Espionage Act of 1917
used to silence protests against U.S. involvement in World War I; the internment of citizens with
Japanese ancestry during World War II; and the Supreme Court’s questionable deference to the
government in its prosecution of a Vietnam protester who burned his draft card.
132. E.g., id. at 105-06 (“[I]t now seems clear that the Supreme Court’s decisions in World
War I and World War II were plainly wrong . . . The fact that these decisions were written by some
of the Supreme Court’s staunchest defenders of civil liberties . . . only highlights the difficulty of
preserving civil liberties in the midst of war.”).
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and procedures that prevent the recurrence of such events.
A. Separation of Powers Issues
The government’s brief and Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion
purport to require complete deference to the executive’s detention of
Hamdi for the sake of preserving the federal government’s separated
powers. In reality, this position conflates the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers into the singular hands of the executive. The executive
alone created the criteria it used to classify Hamdi as an enemy
combatant, and determined the length and condition of his detention. The
executive alone retained custody of Hamdi. And the executive claimed
that it alone could have adjudicated the matter by, first, denying judicial
review completely133 and, second, asserting that habeas review was
limited only to the question whether detention per se was authorized.134
Criticizing the president’s assertion of his prerogative to merge these
powers,135 Neal Katyal and Laurence Tribe observed:
A time of terror may not be the ideal moment to trifle with the most
time-tested postulates of government under law. It is certainly not a
good time to dispense lightly with bedrock principles of our
constitutional system. Central among those principles is that great
power must be held in check and that the body that defines what
conduct to outlaw, the body that prosecutes violators, and the body that
adjudicates guilt and dispenses punishment should be three distinct
entities. To fuse those three functions under one man’s ultimate rule,
and to administer the resulting simulacrum of justice in a system of
tribunals created by that very same authority, is to mock the very notion
of constitutionalism and to make light of any aspiration to live by the
rule of law.136

The Hamdi Court did much to preserve the separation of judicial and
executive powers by insisting on more than mere nominal review of the
executive’s authorization to detain. By guaranteeing that habeas
petitioners will be afforded judicial review of their classification as an
enemy combatants the Court partially honored its central function as the
branch of government empowered to determine guilt and punishment.
Unfortunately, the Court’s effort to compromise between Hamdi’s and
133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See Exec. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1259.
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the government’s competing interests confuses the separation of powers
of the three branches. By limiting the process afforded citizens who are
accused of being enemy combatants, the plurality’s decision surrendered
to the executive many of the safeguards that the judiciary should use to
protect the public against the arbitrary exercise of power. Furthermore,
the Hamdi decision itself is an incursion by the judiciary into the
legislative domain in its selection of which due process elements should
and should not be retained in citizen enemy combatant petitions. Finally,
the Hamdi decision completely neglected the Article I incursions of the
Bush administration’s detention policy by legitimizing the executive’s
exercise of the legislative power to create the right to detain someone,
and its establishment of inferior tribunals.
1. Executive incursions into the judiciary
Due process is often considered to be a collection of protections of
individual liberties and indeed it is as much. But it is also a structural
protection that is meant to prevent excessive blurring of the lines
between the executive and judicial powers.137 This is achieved by
preventing the executive from becoming the “judge in his own case”138
that would combine executive and judicial functions making both
arbitrary and open to abuse. Thus, the protections of due process function
not only as a safeguard for individuals, but also as “guideposts for the
exercise of executive authority[,] . . . at once [protecting] individual
[liberty] and standard[s] of executive conduct.”139
By surrendering certain procedural protections because they are
inconvenient to the executive’s prosecution of the War Against
Terrorism, the Hamdi decision blurs the line between executive and
judicial powers that are meant to be maintained as distinct. By making
hearsay admissible, and then presuming its truth,140 the Court removed at
least two of the guideposts that define the proper limits of executive
conduct. The presumption in favor of the government’s case shifts the
burden of proof to the habeas petitioner, eviscerating the fundamental
premise of the writ of habeas corpus: that he who detains is charged with
proving the legality of the detention. Under the plurality’s “basic
137. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1687 (2004); see also Thomas J. Lepri, Note, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for
Procedural Protections for U.S. Citizens Detained as Enemy Combatants Under Ex Parte Quirin, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 2565 (2003).
138. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610); see generally JOHN V. ORTH, DUE
PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY, ch. 2 (2003).
139. Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 1697.
140. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649 (2004).
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process” the petitioner must prove the legality of his liberty. In these
ways the Hamdi decision allows the executive power to detain to reach
beyond its boundaries into the realm of the judiciary’s power to curb
arbitrary detention. In times of crisis, when the executive has its greatest
incentive to expand its powers, and Congress and the public it represents
have corresponding incentives to capitulate, the judiciary must be at its
strongest and clearest.
2. Judicial incursions into the legislature
Hamdi caused the Supreme Court also to become guilty of acting
beyond its prescribed limits. The plurality held that certain “core
elements” of due process must be afforded the enemy combatant habeas
petitioner.141 As noted above, it explicitly excluded other procedural
protections and left room for the exclusion of still more.142 Indeed, it
seems as though anything not enumerated as part of “basic process” can,
and arguably will be, excluded in future litigation concerning War
Against Terrorism detentions. The question arises as to how the Court
settled on its list of protections that were to be included in “basic
process.” Certain protections that once seemed fundamental—
presumption of innocence of the detainee, burden of proof on the police
power, the right to remain silent, the right against self-incrimination—are
now not deemed to be “core elements” or “essential promises” of the
Constitution, at least in regard to citizens that the executive, on its own,
classifies as enemy combatants. Without an answer to the first question,
a more important structural question arises: is it not the function of the
legislature, the elected representatives of the people, to decide which
liberties and procedural protections the people will surrender?
The separation of federal powers is a structural safeguard to liberty
in two ways; it protects the minority from the potential for tyranny in
majority rule, and it protects individual liberties against arbitrary power
by diffusing power among competing branches.143 Under this scheme,
any national abridgment of civil liberties must be accomplished by all
three branches of the federal government.144 Thus,
[d]espite the more sweeping grant of power to the President in the
opening Vesting Clause of Article II, [the enumerated legislative
powers of Article I] create a framework that requires legislative

141.
142.
143.
144.

See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 1688.
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1268.
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approval for all significant deprivations of liberty. This framework is
itself fractal of a larger order, for the Constitution’s entire structure
creates a ‘rights-protecting asymmetry’ whereby the concurrence of all
three branches is necessary before the government may decisively alter
anyone’s legal rights or entitlements: In a word, these rights may not be
curtailed except pursuant to duly enacted law.145

This concern was the crux of Justices Souter’s and Ginsburg’s argument
in their concurring opinion: That the legislature had deliberately erected
a barrier to the executive and judicial branches’ power to deprive a
citizen of physical liberty without the participation and approval of
Congress through the Non-Detention Act.146 Indeed, the purpose of the
act was to prevent another Korematsu decision, in which the Supreme
Court legitimized racially motivated executive wartime detentions that
were conducted without express congressional authorization.147 The
concurrence concluded that the AUMF was insufficient congressional
approval of Hamdi’s detention and, therefore, that the Court should not
sustain it.148
Justices Scalia and Stevens also took issue with the lack of
congressional participation in Hamdi’s detention. They, like Justices
Souter and Ginsburg, found insufficient congressional authorization to
detain.149 They also focused on the tradition of habeas corpus doctrine,
drawing upon the Suspension Clause and precedent for the premise that
Congress alone can suspend the writ.150 The Hamdi decision was, in
effect, a partial suspension of the writ (by limiting the procedural
protections the writ invokes) in the absence of any congressional action
to suspend. Even if one accepts the plurality’s conclusion that the AUMF
was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Non-Detention Act, i.e.
that the executive was authorized to detain Hamdi, it says nothing of the
deprivation of procedural protections like the rule of evidence against
hearsay or the presumption of innocence in favor of the detainee.
Although incomplete, this was nonetheless a judicial incursion into the
legislative prerogative that dishonors the structural system of the
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. See supra Part II.D.
147. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. “Although an Act of Congress ratified and
confirmed an Executive order authorizing the military to exclude individuals from defined areas and
to accommodate those it might remove, the statute said nothing whatever about the detention of
those who might be removed; internment camps were creatures of the Executive, and confinement in
them rested on assertion of Executive authority.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2654 (2004)
(citations omitted) (Souter, J., concurring).
148. See supra note 104.
149. See supra note 103.
150. See supra Part II.E.
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Constitution, and, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, unduly enlarges the power
of the Court at the expense of Congress’s authority.151 In essence, the
Hamdi plurality decided that the executive could not legislate
abridgments to due process, but the Supreme Court could. Although the
Court recognized that “commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection,”152
it failed to see that it also requires the protection of legislative approval.
By ratifying in part and “fixing” (as Justice Scalia put it) in part the
executive’s action against Hamdi, the plurality participated with the
executive in the usurpation of Congress’s power to define the curtailment
of the public’s liberties. Removing this power (and, more importantly,
this responsibility) from the representatives of the people seriously
undermines those structural protections that Madison and others saw as
the fundamental barrier to tyranny.153 This remains true even if
Congress’s members prefer to insulate themselves from potentially
unpopular decisions by allowing the president or the Supreme Court to
abridge civil liberties. The Court should have put the ball back into
Congress’s court by holding that, unless it legislated and empowered the
president to prosecute and detain Hamdi legally, it would order his
release. Only representatives directly accountable to their constituencies
and endowed by the Constitution with legislative power should take
action regarding the quantity and quality of liberty that American citizens
enjoy.
3. Executive incursions into the legislature
The Hamdi decision ratified two improper legislative actions taken
151. Scalia, in his dissent, stated:
It should not be thought, however, that the plurality’s evisceration of the Suspension
Clause augments, principally, the power of Congress. As usual, the major effect of its
constitutional improvisation is to increase the power of the Court. Having found a
congressional authorization for detention of citizens where none clearly exists; and
having discarded the categorical procedural protection of the Suspension Clause; the
plurality then proceeds . . . to prescribe what procedural protections it thinks appropriate.
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2672 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2646-47 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)).
153. J. Harvie Wilkinson III stated:
[For Jefferson] . . . ‘the solution was clear: a bill of rights, which he advocated from the
moment he first saw the Constitution. . . . But Madison—who in the end would write the
national Bill of Rights—pointed out to Jefferson that a limited enumeration of human
rights would never prevent anyone from misusing power. Only structural balances within
a government, Madison thought, pitting one force against another, could keep the misuse
of power in check and so protect minority rights.
Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 1688 (quoting BERNARD BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE
GENIUS AND AMBIGUITY OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 48 (2003)); see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
NOS. 10, 47 (James Madison).
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by the executive with respect to enemy combatant detentions: the
president’s creation of military commissions and his expansion of the
enemy combatant category.
Two months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
President Bush issued a Military Order through which he created military
commissions to try suspected terrorists and al-Qaeda collaborators.154
Yet the creation of “tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court” is an
enumerated power of Congress.155 A review of precedents on inferior
tribunals led Professor Pfander to conclude:
The inferior tribunals account suggests reasons to proceed cautiously in
the consideration of the legality of military tribunals or commissions
for the trial of illegal enemy combatants, especially any who claim U.S.
citizenship or commit alleged crimes on U.S. soil. The account holds
that the President lacks power to fashion his own set of tribunals, free
from legislative control. Instead, the Constitution empowers Congress
to create inferior tribunals, including all courts that act as such outside
the parameters of Article III.156

In Milligan, the Court held that, even when Congress properly creates
military tribunals, they cannot be used to try citizens when civil courts
are open and unobstructed.157 Although the plurality reads Quirin to
modify that holding to allow military trials of citizen enemy combatants,
Katyal and Tribe assert that the general principle that “congressional
authorization [is] at least a necessary requirement for such tribunals” has
“never [been] repudiated in subsequent cases.”158 This principle “leaves
the president little unilateral freedom to craft an order to detain people on
his own suspicion for indefinite warehousing or trial at his pleasure in a
system of military justice.”159 And yet, that is exactly what the Military
Order has done: it has authorized the Secretary of Defense to detain
individuals classified as enemy combatants and to appoint military
commissions to try them.160
154. Exec. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court. . . .”).
156. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 757 (2004) (emphasis added).
157. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
158. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1279-80.
159. Id.
160. Exec. Order, supra note 154, at § 3 (“Any individual subject to this order shall be - (a)
detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the
United States . . . .”); id at § 4(b) (“[T]he Secretary of Defense . . . shall issue such orders and
regulations, including orders for the appointment of one or more military commissions, as may be
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The plurality opinion lacks a clear rejection of the executive’s claim
of authority to appoint military commissions with jurisdiction over
enemy combatants of the War Against Terrorism without congressional
input.161 Instead, the opinion vaguely implies that military tribunals
“appropriately authorized and properly constituted” could meet the
standards of “basic process” without making clear that such authorization
and constitution must come from Congress.162 The Court should have
clearly repudiated the executive’s use of this legislative power, especially
when it is employed against American citizens. While it asserted the
Court’s right to oversee habeas petitions, it should have invalidated the
use of these commissions and sent the issue back to the president. The
president then could have made his recommendation to Congress for
authorization of the tribunals, specifications as to who could be tried by
them, and so forth. This would have allowed all three branches to pass
off on the detention scheme and reduce the risk of abuse.
The Hamdi decision also improperly validated the executive’s
exercise of legislative powers in defining the extent of its authority to
detain. This Note has already discussed the concerns of four of the
justices that Congress had not clearly authorized Hamdi’s detention.163 If
this is the case, then the executive acted as a legislature in expanding the
authorization to cover Hamdi. Even if the AUMF is sufficient
authorization for detention, Hamdi’s classification as an enemy
combatant probably rests upon criteria originating from the executive.
Congress defined the offenses that qualified someone for trial by military
commission, and to this the Department of Defense added twenty
more.164 This action has been called “spectacular usurpation of the
legislative function,” and indeed, it flows naturally out of the executive’s
argument that authorization to use the military against those responsible
for the September 11 attacks is actually a blank check of power over
anyone it labels an “enemy combatant.”165 The government and Justice
necessary to carry out [trials of enemy combatants].”).
161. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (2004) (“There remains the possibility that the
standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted
military tribunal.”).
162. Cf. Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantánamo Cases, 2004
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 49, 66-67 (2004) (“[The Rasul and Hamdi decisions] should force a tremendous
rethinking of the way the commissions will operate. In my view, the entire process for the
commissions is flawed from start to finish, from their procedure to their substance to their
adjudication.”).
163. See supra Part II.D; notes 147-51 and accompanying text. The four justices are Souter,
Ginsburg, Scalia, and Stevens.
164. Katyal, supra note 162, at 67; see also General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense,
Military Commission Instruction No. 2, Crimes and Elements for Trial by Military Commission
(April 30, 2003), at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mci2.pdf.
165. Katyal, supra note 162, at 67 (“This spectacular usurpation of the legislative function is
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Thomas argued that congressional participation is not necessary because
these detention powers were inherent to the president’s Article II
Commander-in-Chief powers.166 However, a recent survey of the history
of the federal detention power revealed that there never was such
authority inherent in the executive branch; it has always resided with the
legislature despite the contrary assertions and efforts of many
presidents.167 Justice Souter’s structural argument against implying
authorization to detain in order to satisfy the Non-Detention Act is as
applicable here. He wrote:
The defining character of American constitutional government is its
constant tension between security and liberty, serving both by partial
helpings of each. In a government of separated powers, deciding finally
on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace
or war (or some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the
Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to
maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch
of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance
between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to
victory. . . .”168

Permitting the executive to create an added list of offenses by which it
will classify aliens,169 American citizens captured abroad,170 and
American citizens apprehended domestically171 as “enemy combatants”
and thereby deny them due process is to allow exactly the arbitrary
exercise of power to which American citizens applaud themselves as
being immune. This capricious use of power is most easily illustrated by
the differing fates of Yaser Hamdi and John Walker Lindh. Lindh, the
executive decreed, was not an enemy combatant (even though he was
found armed and in the company of enemy troops), and so was provided
a lawyer and access to family, prosecuted criminally, and afforded the
full array of due process and constitutional protections.172 Hamdi, on the
bound to have predictable consequences: offenses are consistently defined in ways that benefit the
prosecution. Indeed, the offenses are all defined after the fact, raising the concern that the offenses
are defined to fit particular offenders, rather than being demarcated in a sober and evenhanded
way.”).
166. See supra Part II.B.3 and Part II.F.
167. Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (2004).
168. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2655 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
169. E.g., Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
170. E.g., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633.
171. E.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
172. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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other hand, was classified as an enemy combatant, and so was denied
access to anyone but military interrogators and held in military custody
for nearly three years. The executive has refused to disclose the factual
differences (if there are any) that dictated the disparate fates of Lindh and
Hamdi, and it has argued that no other branch of government should
have any oversight of these determinations. This is not the regularity,
transparency, and equality of rule of law; this is rule by executive fiat.
The Hamdi decision partially ameliorated that condition by
reasserting the principle of judicial review of a habeas petitioner’s
detention. The Court did not go far enough, however, because it left the
executive’s legislation untouched. Even worse, the Court indirectly
validated the criteria created by the executive by affording a different,
lower standard of review to citizens classified as enemy combatants by
the executive. In other words, the Court allowed the executive to apply
rules of its own devising – a dangerous conflation of legislative and
executive powers. The Court thus protected its own jurisdiction over
habeas petitioners, but did not protect Congress’s domain over the
creation of crimes and authorization to detain.
Instead, the Court should have remanded with an order to the lower
courts to scrutinize the criteria the government used to classify Hamdi as
a combatant, and to weed out any criterion not created by Congress. If
the executive determined that the criteria it created were essential to
success in the War Against Terrorism, again, the president could
recommend their adoption to Congress.
This failure of the Court to observe strictly the separation of powers
is unacceptable given that “[a]t stake . . . is nothing less than the essence
of a free society. Even more important than the method of selecting the
people’s rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints
imposed on the Executive by the rule of law.”173 This constraint is one of
the few assertions of the Magna Carta whose applicability has endured
the centuries because of its essential nature to limited government.174
Moreover, the principal method of constraint created by the Founders is
the separation of powers. Thus,
the Constitution sets up a structure whereby the concurrence of all three
branches is normally needed in order to authorize a decisive departure
from the legal status quo. Certainly, when a President is to take action
173. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. MAGNA CARTA ¶¶ 39 & 40 (“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of
his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor
will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement [sic]
of his equal or by the law of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or
justice.”).
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that puts basic constitutional guarantees at risk, legislative authorization
is presumptively required. Nothing in the Constitution, including the
Commander-in-Chief Clause, alters this basic constitutional
arrangement.175

B. Inadequate Preservation of Habeas Corpus Protections
A principal purpose of the separation of powers is to ensure the
preservation of American civil liberties through the end of a security
crisis. The writ of habeas corpus is an essential tool of this system. It is
the vehicle through which the unlawfully detained may invoke due
process protections by requiring their captor to justify the detention. The
Hamdi decision’s sacrifice of many, if not most, due process protections
eviscerates the effectiveness of habeas corpus and weakens the barrier
that centuries of experience erected between the individual and the
state’s executive power. The “basic process” standard articulated by the
plurality is unclear and may prove ineffective. What constitutes a “fair
opportunity to rebut” the government’s evidence? How secure, for
example, is Hamdi’s right to access counsel?176 What is the evidentiary
tipping point at which the burden of proof shifts from the government to
the detainee?177 What if the detainee alleges that the government’s
evidence was obtained through torture and is therefore unreliable or
unfairly self-incriminating?178 According to Hamdi lower courts may use
175. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1266.
176. The plurality’s statement on the matter seems to be dictum and is qualified as applying to
the proceedings on remand:
Hamdi asks us to hold that the Fourth Circuit also erred by denying him immediate
access to counsel upon his detention and by disposing of the case without permitting him
to meet with an attorney. Since our grant of certiorari in this case, Hamdi has been
appointed counsel, with whom he has met for consultation purposes on several occasions,
and with whom he is now being granted unmonitored meetings. He unquestionably has
the right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on remand. No further
consideration of this issue is necessary at this stage of the case.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2652 (2004) (citation omitted). The government contends that
Hamdi’s access to counsel is a matter for executive discretion and did not concede that he was
entitled to such. Brief for Respondents at 39-42, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No.
03-6696). The possibility remains, therefore, that a court could accept the government’s argument
that access to counsel would jeopardize national security or interfere with military operations or
interrogation and deny the right since it is not enumerated as a “core element” of due process in the
plurality’s opinion.
177. If hearsay is allowed, is the Mobbs Declaration sufficient, as the Fourth Circuit found, or
is something more substantial required of the government?
178. As time goes on, this seems to be less a remote possibility than a probability. See, e.g.,
Charles H. Brower II, The Lives of Animals, the Lives of Prisoners, and the Revelations of Abu
Ghraib, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1353, 1379-80 (2004) (reviewing the prisoner abuse scandals
of the War Against Terrorism and concluding that “the facts reveal an ever-expanding population of
detainees intentionally placed ever farther beyond the protection of the law.”); Maj. Gen. Antonio M.
Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, at
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their discretion in deciding how those questions are to be answered. The
government might easily exploit this vagueness. For example, if the case
against a terror suspect is weak, the government could classify him as an
enemy combatant and use Hamdi to remove most of the due process
constraints.179 Whether one is inclined to suspect the government of such
duplicity, or whether one implicitly trusts government action, where civil
liberties are concerned the most sensible approach is the healthy
skepticism and wariness exemplified by this nation’s revolutionary and
founding generations.180
The weakening of due process standards runs the risk of turning the
habeas review into a rubber-stamping of executive detention, a judicial
imprimatur legitimizing detentions that do not conform to constitutional
and common law standards.181 A court sympathetic to the executive’s
national security dilemma, like the Fourth Circuit, or ideologically prone
to give wide latitudes of deference to the executive, like Justice Thomas,
will not be inclined to afford detainees much more than the bare
minimum that is required by the relaxed standards of “basic process.”182

http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (the military’s investigation report of the Abu
Ghraib prison scandal revealing widespread torture and failures in the chain of command to stop it);
Alberto F. Gonzales, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Counsel to the President
Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A 1 (August 1, 2002), at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf
(counsel to the president concluding that “certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading” but will
only constitute torture if the physical pain caused is “equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even
death. For purely mental pain or suffering . . . it must result in significant psychological harm of
significant duration, e.g. lasting for months or even years.”).
179. This problem with the Hamdi decision is compounded by the Executive’s usurpation of
legislative powers in creating offenses that will define a detainee as an enemy combatant. See supra
Part III.A.3.
180. E.g., JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS, ¶ 3 (1785) Here, Madison stated:
Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this
prudent jealousy to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of
the late Revolution. The free men of America did not wait till usurped power had
strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the
consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the
principle. We revere this lesson too much soon to forget it.
Id; see generally, GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87, ch. 1
(1998).
181. Katyal and Tribe forecast that “without suitably sculpted legislation the prospect of
habeas review could require the disclosure of intelligence information in such proceedings—a
prospect that could lead courts to water habeas review down to nothing more than a hollow
formality.” Katyal & Tribe, supra note 113, at 1308. This potential is exacerbated by the fact that
“basic process” has already hurried this process along by watering down the procedural protections
that habeas corpus invokes.
182. The bare minimum required by “basic process” is not much: “notice of the factual basis
for [a detainee’s] classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions
before a neutral decisionmaker.” Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-49.
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It is conceivable that a court not interested in questioning the executive
may give the detainee “notice of the factual basis for his classification as
an enemy combatant,”183 grant a hearing, accept whatever reasonable
evidence the government presents, and send the detainee right back to
indefinite detention. The plurality’s “basic process” standard is too
relaxed to require a court more sympathetic to the government’s interests
than to the detainee’s to conduct a truly meaningful review, one that
would insure that detention is justified.
These concerns should not be considered “ideological or unduly
melodramatic.”184 As the plurality itself held, we should consider the
ramifications of this doctrine on “the erroneously detained individual.”185
Consider the plight of Brandon Mayfield, a Muslim convert and lawabiding attorney from Oregon. He was held on a material witness
warrant, like José Padilla, after the FBI fingerprint unit mistakenly
matched his fingerprint to the train bombings in Madrid, Spain in March
2004.186 Subsequent investigation revealed that sloppy laboratory
practices and the defensiveness of a lead FBI fingerprint expert were the
principal causes of the mistake that led to Mayfield’s incarceration.187
One wonders what consequences would follow if Mr. Mayfield had been
re-classified as an enemy combatant and transferred incommunicado to a
naval brig as was Mr. Padilla. According to Hamdi, he would suddenly
find that certain “non-essential” constitutional protections such as the
presumption of innocence, did not apply to him. With a presumption in
favor of the government’s evidence, limited or no access to counsel, and
other due process protections suspended by the executive’s unilateral
designation of him as an enemy combatant, Mayfield would have a
difficult time rebutting the evidence that resulted from error within the
executive. In fact, his exoneration would rely entirely on the will of the
executive to expose its own error.188 The odds would be stacked against

183. Id.
184. Vladeck, supra note 167, at 195.
185. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2647.
186. See, e.g., Blaine Harden, FBI Faulted in Arrest of Ore. Lawyer; Study by Forensic
Experts Cites Mistakes in Fingerprint Identification, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2004, at A2.
187. See, e.g., Flynn McRoberts & Maurice Possley, Report Blasts FBI Lab; Peer Pressure
Led to False ID of Madrid Fingerprint, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 14, 2004, at C1 (“Once the mind-set
occurred with the initial examiner, the subsequent examinations were tainted,’ Robert Stacey, chief
of the FBI laboratory’s quality assurance and training unit, wrote in a report outlining the findings of
the international review committee. ‘To disagree was not an expected response.’”).
188. The decision to shroud the Quirin case in secrecy was due to the Roosevelt
administration’s desire to hide FBI operational errors in apprehending the defendants; evidence of
serious FBI mistakes would have undermined the president’s desire to use the case for propaganda
purposes. Danelski, supra note 113, at 66-67. Given the political pressures to succeed placed on a
president who oversaw the most devastating foreign attack on American soil on September 11, 2001,
it should not be too far-fetched to imagine the Bush administration (or any administration) hiding
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Mayfield in such a way that an unjustified and mistaken detention of an
American citizen could be perpetuated, based upon the will of the
executive, because the constitutional safeguards meant to prevent it are
not “essential promises” of the Constitution or “core elements” of due
process.189
To guard against that possibility, what is required is an exacting
habeas review according to its tradition, not a weaker one. As James
Pfander observed, apart from the separation of powers questions raised
by allowing the executive to establish tribunals,
the designation of an individual as an enemy combatant presents the
classic issue of jurisdictional boundaries on which constitutional rights
of the first magnitude depend. Citizens . . . enjoy familiar rights to
counsel, bail, freedom from self-incrimination, and a speedy trial
before a jury of their peers—rights that an enemy combatant
designation avowedly sacrifices in favor of indefinite detention and
interrogation. With so much depending on the designation’s factual
accuracy, the inferior tribunals account suggests the need for relatively
searching review of the government’s enemy combatant designation.190

Not only does Hamdi permit military tribunals to control the level of a
citizen detainee’s access to habeas rights through its unilateral enemy
combatant classification, but when the judiciary reviews the evidence
justifying detention it is already skewed in the government’s favor. In
other words, the judiciary co-adjudicates with the executive; the
executive judges in its classification of the detainee, and the courts finish
with a cursory examination of the executive’s determination. It should be
the other way around: courts should approach the detainee as a free
person until the executive has shown otherwise.
C. Lack of Predictability and Uniformity
Finally, the need for a bright-line rule also derives from core ideals
sought after in the law: uniformity and predictability. The Hamdi
decision creates no predictability for detainees, nor uniformity for
government actors. Already the executive has treated two detainees from
mistakes and exaggerating success in order to present the impression of strength in the War Against
Terrorism. Under these circumstances, the combination of enemy combatant status with the lowered
procedural protections of “basic process” presented the executive with a dangerous opportunity to
hide the FBI’s “Mayfield error” through indefinite detention. Mayfield’s liberty would then rely on
the political expediency of his release, a legal nightmare that habeas corpus was intended to prevent.
189. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-49.
190. Pfander, supra note 156, at 759.
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factually similar, if not identical, situations in drastically different
ways,191 an aberration not corrected by Hamdi. Although Hamdi created
some limitations on the power that the executive had enjoyed since 2001,
the decision does not establish much set procedure that the government is
required to follow. Thus, the executive is still allowed to pursue the
course of action most advantageous to its policies without regard for the
implications those acts have on the individual liberty interests of detained
American citizens. As a result, Mr. Lindh, captured in Afghanistan, was
given counsel, and prosecuted criminally, whereas Mr. Hamdi, also
captured in Afghanistan, was held incommunicado indefinitely.
Likewise, Mr. Padilla, captured in a U.S. airport, was also held
incommunicado indefinitely. Unlike Lindh and Hamdi, Mr. Padilla was
not captured in a foreign combat zone in possession of weapons, but, like
Milligan, was captured on U.S. territory at a time when the civilian
courts were open and habeas corpus had not been suspended.
Before Hamdi the executive claimed complete discretion to treat
these citizen detainees as it wished—clearly a circumstance the
Constitution was designed to prevent. Hamdi does little to remedy this
for a detainee appearing in a court that tends to favor heavily the
government’s security interests, like the Fourth Circuit.
Further evidence of this flaw is found in the considerably divergent
lower federal court rulings on Mr. Hamdi’s petition,192 and in other
enemy combatant cases in which conflicting constitutional
interpretations have led to very different results.193 The Mathews
balancing test does nothing to cure these disparate outcomes.
Consequently, two habeas petitioners in the same situation, making the
same arguments, are likely to face very different outcomes depending on
how their respective courts employ the Mathews test. Disparate outcomes
are certainly possible with any subjective test that is applied differently
by different courts. However, the freedom from unjustified and indefinite
detention that is so fundamental to our liberal tradition cannot be served
191. E.g., compare Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (where Mr. Hamdi was detained as an enemy
combatant) with United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002) (where a detainee of
identical circumstances, i.e. a U.S. citizen captured as an enemy combatant on the field of battle in
Afghanistan, was prosecuted under normal criminal procedure); see also Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2554
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing to the difference between Lindh’s treatment and Hamdi’s).
192. See supra Part II.B for the disparity between the decisions of the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit.
193. Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
Government’s security interests so outweighed Mr. Hamdi’s liberty interests as to make one hearsay
document sufficient to justify indefinite detention), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 2633, with Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the president’s inherent war powers did not
extend to cover the detention of an American citizen as an enemy combatant, and, further, that the
AUMF did not satisfy the Non-Detention Act’s requirement of express congressional authorization
to detain American citizens at all), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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by such a test. Habeas corpus requires bright-line rules and their strict
application as advocated, for example, by Justice Scalia’s dissent.194
The disparity between outcomes for similar petitioners that results
from the differing rules of men is what the rule of law has always sought
to avoid. Professor Brooks observed:
[L]egal rules that were designed to protect basic rights and vulnerable
groups have lost much of their analytical force, and thus, too often,
their practical force.
The erosion of clear boundaries in some areas of the law also leads
to a slippery slope, allowing the disingenuous to assert that there is also
blurriness even in areas of the law that remain both relevant and clear.
Thus, lawyers for the Bush administration went from the legitimate
conclusion that the Geneva Conventions cannot easily be applied to
many modern conflicts, to the disingenuous and flawed conclusion that
there were therefore no legal constraints at all on U.S. interrogation
practices. In fact, regardless of whether or not the Geneva Conventions
apply to a given conflict, and regardless of whether or not a particular
detainee is entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions,
international law and U.S. treaty commitments prohibit the use of
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of
detainees—and there can be little doubt that many of the interrogation
practices authorized by the Pentagon constitute torture or cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment. In practice, then, the breakdown of
clear boundaries in some areas of the law also dangerously undermines
the efficacy of other legal rules.195

IV. CONCLUSION
Times of national crisis like the War Against Terrorism require
bright-line rules that enforce the pre-defined, proper boundaries of
government action, especially executive action. Such times are not
appropriate for judicial improvisation or innovation because the stakes
are high and judgment is often clouded by passion, patriotism, fear, or
powerful desires for governmental strength and efficiency.
[T]he war against terrorism is fundamentally different than any
previous conflict this nation has fought . . . . [I]t is clear that there will
never be a negotiated surrender in the war against terrorism and that the

194. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660-74.
195. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law
of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 681-82 (2004).
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terrorist threat is unlikely to end anytime soon. We do not have the
luxury, therefore, of regarding any restrictions on liberty as temporary
expedients, like wartime rationing. Instead, such restrictions must be
regarded as potentially permanent transformations in America’s
constitutional value system. At a bare minimum, that suggests the need
for closer judicial and political scrutiny . . . .196

If civil liberties are to be sacrificed temporarily in the name of
greater security, then that decision must be made by elected
representatives of the people with the constitutional power and political
responsibility assigned to them. That process would create a temporary
congressional measure that could be repealed when the crisis is over, or
if the measure is found to be excessive or insufficient. Instead, we now
have precedent that weakens the structural protections of the Constitution
firmly rooted in the law.
Where the legislature remains silent, there the writ of habeas corpus
should speak against executive detention. Authorization to detain
American citizens should not be implied. If there is no explicit detention
authority granted and if the Suspension Clause has not been invoked,
then the writ of habeas corpus demands either prosecution under existing
legislated offenses or release. The American people should not have to
trade the insecurity created by terrorism for insecurity about their civil
liberties.
Jared Perkins

196. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 116.

